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Abstract
Asymmetric inﬂation response to aggregate shocks is an identifying macro-prediction of state dependent
pricing models with trend inﬂation (Ball and Mankiw, 1994). The paper uses the natural experiment of
symmetric value-added tax (VAT) changes in Hungary with highly asymmetric inﬂation responses to provide
further evidence for state-dependent pricing and for the Ball-Mankiw conjecture.
The paper shows, furthermore, that while a standard menu cost model like that of Golosov and Lucas (2007)
underestimates the observed asymmetry, a model of multi-product ﬁrms that takes sectoral heterogeneity ex-
plicitly into consideration can quantitatively account for the inﬂation asymmetry observed in the data. This
aggregation bias of the standard model is the result of the strong interaction term between trend inﬂation and
menu costs in determining asymmetry in the model, and the positive correlation between sectoral inﬂation
rates and menu costs in the data. The paper implies that the real effects of negative monetary shocks can
be substantial even in the standard Golosov and Lucas (2007) model if these additional factors are taken into
consideration.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E30.
Keywords: Aggregation Bias, Inﬂation Asymmetry, Menu Cost, Sectoral Heterogeneity, Value-Added Tax.
Összefoglalás
Trendinﬂáció esetén az állapotfügg˝ o árazási modellekben az aggregált sokkoknak aszimmetrikus inﬂációs
hatása van (Ball-Mankiw, 1994). Ebben a tanulmányban az ilyen típusú modellek és a Ball-Mankiw-féle me-
chanizmus mellett érvelünk, a természetes kísérletként is felfogható magyarországi ÁFA-változások aszim-
metrikus inﬂációs hatásának a felhasználásával.
A tanulmányban bemutatjuk, hogy míg a Golosov-Lucas (2007)-féle egyszer˝ u étlapköltségmodell alulbecsli
a megﬁgyelt aszimmetriát, a többtermékes vállalatokat feltételez˝ o és szektorális heterogenitást közvetlenül
ﬁgyelembe vev˝ o modell képes az adatokban megﬁgyelthez hasonló mérték˝ u aszimmetria el˝ oállítására. Az
alapmodellbeli aggregációs torzítás oka kett˝ os: egyrészt a modellbeli aszimmetriát a trendinﬂáció és az étlap-
költség szorzata is befolyásolja, másrészt pedig a szektorszint˝ u adatokban a trendinﬂáció és az étlapköltség
közötti korreláció pozitív. A tanulmány alapján a negatív monetáris sokkok reálhatása még a Golosov-Lucas
(2007)-féle alapmodellben is jelent˝ os lehet, amennyiben ezeket a megfontolásokat is ﬁgyelembe vesszük.
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1 Introduction
This paper documents an asymmetric inﬂation response to transparent symmetric aggregate shocks and dis-
cusses its implications to the pricing debate. On the one hand, this observed asymmetry supports the state-
dependent pricing assumption: as Ball and Mankiw (1994) showed, menu cost models with trend inﬂation
predict asymmetry, while standard ﬂexible or time-dependent pricing models (Calvo, 1983) would predict
symmetry. On the other hand, it raises quantitative issues about the standard menu cost model of Golosov
and Lucas (2007), that not only underestimates the frequency effects of the shocks, but also predicts the
inﬂation-asymmetry to be small. A model that reproduces the frequency effects and the level of asymme-
try observed in the data modiﬁes essential predictions of these models: in the more realistic model, the real
effects of a negative monetary policy shock can be substantial.
ThenaturalexperimentthepapercapitalizingonhappenedinHungary(weshallrefertoitasthe“Hungarian
experiment”), and involved symmetric changes in the value added tax (VAT) rates with highly asymmetric
inﬂationeffects. Theshockshappenedinasimilarmacro-environmentwithacoupleofmonthsdifference. In
2006, the Hungarian government sequentially closed the gap between two different VAT rates: it decreased
25% rate to 20% in January and increased the 15% rate to 20% in September. It did it in steps in hope of
political gains in the April elections for the preelection tax cut, which ensures the exogeneity of the shocks.
Therefore these VAT shocks provide textbook cases of easily measurable, exogenous aggregate cost push
shocks to gross prices, that Hungarian ﬁrms are required by law to quote.
The experiment is highly suitable for analyzing sectoral and aggregate inﬂation asymmetry.1 Gabriel and
Reiff (2010) have documented that the tax changes – inﬂuencing similar proportion of products2 – had highly
asymmetric inﬂation effects: the immediate pass-through of the affected products for the increase was over
85%, while for the decrease it was less than 26%.
Asymmetric inﬂation response to transparent symmetric shocks (as the VAT changes, or monetary policy
shocks) are unexplained by standard ﬂexible or time-dependent pricing models, while they are natural macro-
predictions of state-dependent pricing models with trend inﬂation (Ball and Mankiw, 1994). It is straightfor-
ward to see why the ﬂexible price assumption would not interact with trend inﬂation: ﬁrms would adjust
their nominal prices every instance to follow the aggregate inﬂation rate and their additional response to
aggregate shocks would imply a full and symmetric pass-through. In the time-dependent model of Calvo
(1983), the argument against aggregate asymmetry is more subtle because trend inﬂation introduces a ﬁrm-
level asymmetry. This asymmetry rests on forward looking ﬁrms who set their prices for several periods
in advance: their dynamically optimal price is larger than their static optimal price in the current period
(“front loading”).3 This trend inﬂation-induced bias would mean higher responses for positive shocks and
lower responses to negative ones for every single ﬁrm. But this type of asymmetry is present even in the
absence of aggregate shocks: the constant fraction of price-changing ﬁrms always front load, so there is no
additionalasymmetryfromfrontloadingwhenanaggregateshockhits. Sotheadditional (i.e. shock-induced,
as opposed to trend inﬂation-induced) response to symmetric aggregate shocks will not be asymmetric.
In menu cost models this kind of front loading is also present, but – as Ball and Mankiw (1994) show – there
is an additional source of asymmetry after aggregate shocks. This additional source is endogenous selection:
since the ﬁrms’ expected average relative price until the next adjustment is always below its desired level
(exceptforthemomentsofadjustment), relativelysmallpositiveshockswilltriggeradjustment(whilesimilar
negative shocks will not). In other words, facing a positive shock in an inﬂationary environment, the relative
1 Although none of the products were affected by both tax changes, there are close substitutes affected by the different tax changes: e.g. cookies were
hit by the tax increase, while chocolate chip cookies were hit by the tax decrease.
2 51% and 46.9% in the sample.
3 This is because ﬁrms set their nominal price so that their average relative price until their next adjustment is optimal, and the relative price is declining
with constant nominal price and positive trend inﬂation.
4 MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/3MNB woRkiNG PAPeRs • 2010/3 7
INTRoduCTIoN
INTRODUCTION
proportion of price-increasing ﬁrms to the price-decreasing ones is higher than the relative proportion of
price-decreasing ﬁrms to price-increasing ones in case of a negative shock, which leads to asymmetry.4
Stylized facts from micro-level Hungarian Consumer Price Index (CPI) data indicate that the main reason
of the observed asymmetry is indeed the interaction of trend inﬂation and menu costs. On the one hand,
state dependent models with menu cost are a valid framework for us: ﬂexible price models would have se-
rious difﬁculty in explaining the fact that at the months of tax increase only a bit less than 60% of affected
ﬁrms changed their prices,5 but the same number would also embarrass a Calvo-type model with exogenous
probability of price change (12% in our data). On the other hand, there are three stylized facts supporting
that trend inﬂation has to be an unavoidable ingredient in any explanations of the Hungarian experiment.
First, the two main sectors behave in line with the Ball and Mankiw (1994) model: the observed asymmetry
is much higher in the one with both high inﬂation rate and high level of price stickiness (services) than in the
one that has lower inﬂation rate and lower level of price stickiness (processed food). Second, the observed
asymmetry decreases over time. For the tax increase, the pass-through is immediate as ﬁrms front load their
responses, while for the tax decrease the cumulative pass-through is increasing as ﬁrms adjust by not changing
their prices and letting their relative prices to adjust gradually with the trend inﬂation. Third, going down to
a more disaggregated product level, the larger the product-speciﬁc trend inﬂation is, the larger is the observed
asymmetry, a clear indication that trend inﬂation plays a crucial role in the observed asymmetries.
To provide quantitative evidence for the Ball-Mankiw conjecture, the paper develops and calibrates a struc-
tural model. It ﬁnds that even though the standard structural menu cost model of Golosov and Lucas (2007)
incorporates the Ball-Mankiw channel, it seriously underestimates the aggregate asymmetry. There are two
interacting causes of this.
The ﬁrst is aggregation bias. As the paper shows, the cross effect of trend inﬂation and menu costs has a large
and signiﬁcant effect on the inﬂation-asymmetry. So, if sectoral trend inﬂation - that is a closer proxy for the
competitors’ prices than the aggregate inﬂation rate - is higher in sectors with high level of price stickiness,
then models disregarding sectoral heterogeneity can substantially underestimate the aggregate asymmetry.
Though no theoretical argument we know of explains the correlation between trend inﬂation and price
stickiness, services sectors - with substantial weight in consumption - are generally the most sticky price
sectors with also higher than average trend inﬂation rate,6 as is the case in Hungary. Sectoral calibration
of the menu cost model allows the paper to take sectoral heterogeneity into consideration, and also allows
it to use the sectoral variation in trend-inﬂation, price stickiness and inﬂation asymmetry to better test the
model’s quantitative predictions.7
The second reason why the Golosov-Lucas (2007) model underestimates aggregate inﬂation asymmetry is
that it underestimates the fraction of price changing ﬁrms in the months of the VAT changes (see ﬁgure 1
later), thereby it reduces the asymmetry-ampliﬁcation effect coming from the more frequent price changes.
To correct for this caveat, the paper assumes that changing prices at the months of VAT changes is cheaper
than in normal times. Through this assumption, the model, by construction, can reproduce the observed
frequency increase observed during the VAT shocks, but also gets closer to the lower average size of price
changes observed during the VAT shocks (see ﬁgure 2 later). The lower average menu cost can be justiﬁed
by the existence of multi-product ﬁrms with increasing returns-to-scale in their repricing technology as in
Midrigan (2009).
The paper ﬁnds that the sectoral menu cost model calibrated to hit the sectoral trend inﬂation and standard
pricing moments (frequency and size of price changes) at normal times and during VAT shocks quantita-
4 Ball and Mankiw (1994) show that in fact there is yet another source of additional asymmetry: as ﬁrms know that their nominal price is more likely to
remain in effect if they will be hit by a negative shock, rational ﬁrms set a bit lower initial price, which further increases the asymmetry.
5 Moreover, only 68.2% of the affected ﬁrms changed their prices in the following 4 months of the VAT shock.
6 A potential explanation for the relatively large trend inﬂation in the services sector is the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
7 This choice, furthermore, allows the paper to control for the different sectoral composition of the observed tax changes. This is necessary as VAT-
changes affected various sectors differently (the VAT-increase hitting sectors with more ﬂexible prices disproportionally).
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tively hits the inﬂation asymmetry observed in the data, so it provides quantitative evidence for the Ball and
Mankiw (1994) conjecture.
There is a long line of research documenting asymmetric price developments to monetary and cost shocks
using aggregate (see e.g. Cover, 1992, Ravn and Sola, 2004) and sectoral data (Peltzman, 2000) in reduced form
estimations. Our paper is the ﬁrst we know of, however, which uses micro-level structural calibration and
VAT shocks to analyze the effects of the asymmetry, which are arguably more easily measurable and identiﬁ-
able shocks than those used by the previous papers. As standard frictionless, ﬂexible price models, and time
dependent models would have difﬁculty in explaining these asymmetries, our paper is also a contribution to
the growing literature using natural experiments – like the effect of euro introduction to restaurant prices
in Hobijn, Ravenna and Tambalotti (2006) – and special environments – like the high inﬂation episodes in
Mexico in Gagnon (2009) – to provide evidence to the validity of the sticky price assumptions in general and
menu cost models in particular.
We believe that some alternative explanations of asymmetry cannot play a crucial role in the Hungarian
experiment. First, consider an alternative state-dependent model assuming convex adjustment cost of price
changes,likethatofRotemberg(1982). Thismodelwouldalsoimplyasymmetricinﬂationresponse,butwith
opposite sign: in an inﬂationary environment, the additional response of ﬁrms to positive shocks would be
smaller than to a negative one, because the marginal cost of price increase (additional to the trend-inﬂation
induced optimal positive change) would be higher. Moreover, a series of recent papers use search frictions
to explain asymmetric price responses (Cabral and Fishman, 2008, and Yang and Ye, 2008). Their common
key assumption, however, is that the marginal consumers are uninformed about the cost shocks faced by
price setting ﬁrms, which is clearly not applicable to our case of VAT-shocks: these had easily measurable,
widely publicized and uniform effects on all affected ﬁrms. Finally, the asymmetric inﬂation effect due to the
asymmetric shape of the proﬁt function (Devereux and Siu, 2007, Ellingsen et al, 2006) is in fact incorporated
in our model, but numerical results showed that this type of asymmetry is negligible relative to the Ball-
Mankiw-type asymmetry.
The paper is organized as follows. After presenting the main stylized facts of the Hungarian experiment in
Section 2, Section 3 presents the model and explains the numerical algorithm used for its solution. Section
4 describes the data and the moments the paper is about to match. Section 5 presents the results for the
aggregate and the sectoral calibrations and Section 6 concludes.
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2 Stylized facts of the Hungarian experiment
In this section, we describe the Hungarian experiment and present some basic observations on the pricing
responses to the VAT shocks. These observations suggest that a state dependent menu cost model is a valid
framework to study the effects of the shocks and trend inﬂation is a necessary ingredient to explain the
asymmetry observed in the data.
In the months when no VAT changes occured, the Hungarian CPI data shows the standard pricing behavior
documented for other countries (see e.g. Klenow and Krystov, 2008). In our sample of products affected
by the VAT shocks, the fraction of price changing ﬁrms is fairly stable around 12%8 (see ﬁgure 1). The
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In 2006, The Hungarian authorities sequentially closed the gap between two VAT tax rates levied on two
sets of products with each covering approximately half of our sample.9 As table 1 shows, the top rate was
decreased in January 2006 from 25% to 20% and the lower rate was increased in September 2006 from 15%
8 Its relatively low level can be explained by the fact that some sectors with very ﬂexible prices were excluded from the sample (e.g. fuel with special tax
rate developing independently from VAT; with these sectors the average frequency were 18.5%).
9 51% and 46.9% CPI weights. There is also a third, very low tax rate levied on a few subsidized products (drugs, school books). As these products only
constitute 2.1% in CPI-weights of our sample, we will ignore these.
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to 20%. This tax increase in September could not be anticipated at the time of the tax decrease in January, as
it was done by a new government elected in April 2006.
Table 1
VAT rates in Hungary
VAT-rates in Hungary Lower Higher
– Dec 31, 2005 15% 25%
Jan 1, 2006 – Aug 31, 2006 15% 20%
Sep 1, 2006 – 20% 20%
The VAT changes are measurable and transparent cost push shocks directly inﬂuencing the gross prices of
affectedﬁrms, whicharethequotedpricesinHungary–differentlyfromtheU.S.practiceregardingsalestax,
but similarly to most other European countries. This practice is also reinforced by a consumer protection
law requiring also that “consumers can not be forced to calculate prices in their head”.10 This cost push shock
dominated the inﬂation effects during these months as the inﬂation targeting central bank has expressed in
advance that it was not planning to respond to the direct effects of the tax shocks, as these only affect the
price level and have only temporary effects on the measured inﬂation rate.
The tax changes had substantial direct effects on the consumer prices. The aggregate fraction of price-
changing ﬁrms increased substantially (to 42.7% on average from 12%) in the months of the tax changes (see
ﬁgure 1), in line with international evidence (see Gagnon, 2009 and the references there.) This supports the
use of state-dependent menu cost models that predict endogenous increase in the number of price-changing
10 1997.CLV. Law on Consumer Protection and 7/2001. (III. 29.) Ministry of Economy decree and its explanation.
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ﬁrms. The average absolute size of price changes dropped during the tax-changing months (from 11.6% to
8.0%), as it can be seen in ﬁgure 2.
ASYMMETRIC INFLATION EFFECT
The positive and negative VAT shocks of similar magnitude inﬂuencing similar weighted proportion of prod-
ucts had highly asymmetric inﬂation effects. Figure 3 depicts the monthly inﬂation rates around the VAT
changes in 2006 in the processed food and services sectors and among all products. It is apparent from the
ﬁgure that the 5 percentage point tax increase had much bigger impact on the monthly inﬂation rate than the
similar tax decrease.
Figure 3
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Table 2 shows the overall pass-through of unit tax changes that are calculated as the ratio of the inﬂation
effect (of affected and non-affected products) and the change in the average sectoral tax rate.11 For the whole
economy the pass-through for the positive shock was 1.11, while that of the unit tax decrease was 0.41. The
higher than 1 pass-through comes from the fact that there was also price increase among products not affected
by the VAT change.
Stylized facts about sectoral asymmetries provide suggestive evidence that these asymmetries were caused by
the interaction of trend inﬂation and price stickiness. Looking at two of the largest major sectors in the
economy, we see that the sectoral asymmetry is higher in the services sector with higher trend inﬂation and
higher price stickiness (lower fraction of price changing ﬁrms) than in the processed food sector with lower
inﬂation and lower price stickiness, in line with the prediction of the Ball and Mankiw 1994 model.
11 This is the moment we would like our model - with affected and non-affected products - to hit. In the simulations of Section 6, however, we consider
only products facing the same tax rates and shocks uniformly affecting all the products.
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Table 2
Trend-inﬂation, price stickiness and inﬂation asymmetry
Yearly Inﬂation effect of unit tax
Sector Inﬂation Frequency increase decrease
Aggregate 3.4% 12.0% 1.11 0.41
Processed food 4.2% 13.5% 1.04 0.85
Services 8.3% 6.6% 1.15 0.33
Also in line with the Ball-Mankiw argument, the observed asymmetry decreases over time. As table 3 shows,
for the tax increase, the pass-through on the affected products is immediate, and this effect is almost entirely
because of the increased frequency of price increases. For the tax decrease, on the other hand, the cumulative
pass-through is increasing as ﬁrms choose not to respond to trend inﬂation. In this case, the ﬁrst month’s
inﬂation effect was a result of the increased frequency of price decreases, but later it was the decreased fre-
quency of price increases that led to additional inﬂation effects. This is exactly what happens in a model with
menu costs and positive trend inﬂation.
Table 3
Pass-through on affected products of VAT-changes over 1-3 months
Horizon VAT-increase VAT-decrease
1 month 82.5% –25.9%
2 months 82.1% –38.9%
3 months 82.1% –53.3%
A further stylized fact giving a clear indication that inﬂation plays a crucial role in explaining the observed
asymmetry comes from going down to the product level. Here we can observe that the larger is the product-
speciﬁc trend inﬂation, the larger is the observed asymmetry. Figure 4 shows the asymmetry estimates
for products with different trend inﬂation rates. For example, if we estimate the asymmetry of the pass-
throughofthepositiveandnegativetaxshocksonlyforproductswithamoderatetrendinﬂation(say, smaller
than 2.4% per year), the result is 0.62 and 0.39. If we do the same for products with relatively larger trend
inﬂation (say, for products with trend inﬂation smaller than 7.2% per year), the resulting asymmetry is much
larger: 0.78 vs 0.36. Ideally, we should see asymmetry with the opposite sign for products with negative
trend inﬂation. Unfortunately, there were no such products affected by the VAT increase, only by the VAT
decrease.
10 MNB WORKING PAPERS • 2010/3
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pass-through is increasing as ﬁrms choose not to respond to trend inﬂation. In this case, the ﬁrst month’s
inﬂation effect was a result of the increased frequency of price decreases, but later it was the decreased fre-
quency of price increases that led to additional inﬂation effects. This is exactly what happens in a model with
menu costs and positive trend inﬂation.
Table 3
Pass-through on affected products of VAT-changes over 1-3 months
Horizon VAT-increase VAT-decrease
1 month 82.5% –25.9%
2 months 82.1% –38.9%
3 months 82.1% –53.3%
A further stylized fact giving a clear indication that inﬂation plays a crucial role in explaining the observed
asymmetry comes from going down to the product level. Here we can observe that the larger is the product-
speciﬁc trend inﬂation, the larger is the observed asymmetry. Figure 4 shows the asymmetry estimates
for products with different trend inﬂation rates. For example, if we estimate the asymmetry of the pass-
throughofthepositiveandnegativetaxshocksonlyforproductswithamoderatetrendinﬂation(say, smaller
than 2.4% per year), the result is 0.62 and 0.39. If we do the same for products with relatively larger trend
inﬂation (say, for products with trend inﬂation smaller than 7.2% per year), the resulting asymmetry is much
larger: 0.78 vs 0.36. Ideally, we should see asymmetry with the opposite sign for products with negative
trend inﬂation. Unfortunately, there were no such products affected by the VAT increase, only by the VAT
decrease.
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3 The model
The model is a sectoral version of a standard heterogeneous ﬁrm quantitative menu cost model like Golosov
and Lucas (2007) with value added taxes (VAT). The formulation is similar to Klenow and Willis (2006).
THE CONSUMER
The representative consumer consumes a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate (C) of a basket of goods, holds real balances






























The assumption of sector speciﬁc labor supply leads to sectoral labor markets and allows us to assume away
sectoral interactions between large sectors of the economy that is not necessary for our argument. For the
same reason, we assume that the aggregate consumption basket Ct is obtained as a Cobb-Douglas aggregate
of sectoral consumption baskets C s
t . This assumption implies that ﬁxed proportion of nominal expenditure
is going to be spent on a certain sector, so sectoral inﬂation rates are not going to interact. Sectoral con-
sumptions C s






















where αs are sectoral expenditure shares and θ is the elasticity of substitution, ￿ s is the set of the products
in a certain sector, and N s is their measure. Note that with S = 1 and α1 = 1 the model reduces to a standard
non-sectoral model.














t Ls + ˜ Πt +Tt, (2)
where P s
t (i) is the gross price, Bt(ht) is a nominal Arrow-security with state dependent gross return Rt, Mt
is the nominal money balance and Tt is a lump-sum transfer.
In order to express the consumer’s optimality conditions in a convenient form, it is useful to deﬁne the




























The Cobb-Douglas formulation across sectors implies that the consumer will spend a constant αs fraction of









12 The subscript indices denote time (t), superscripts the sector (s) and individual ﬁrms and products are in brackets (i).
13 Dependence on history is suppressed for notational convenience.
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where it is the nominal interest rate.
THE GOVERNMENT AND THE CENTRAL BANK
In line with Hungarian practice, we assume that a subset of ﬁrms (i ∈ ￿ s,1) in each sectors face tax rate τ1
t,
while the remaining ﬁrms face tax rate τ2
t. We assume that these rates (τt(i)) are given exogenously and ﬁrms
do not expect future changes in their tax rates,14 but can respond to the tax rate changes in the same month.










t (i) = T
g
t .
As general in this literature, the central bank is assumed to follow a nominal income targeting rule by main-
taining a predetermined growth rate (gPY) of the nominal aggregate output (PtYt), which we assumed to
be equal to the money supply (Mt). The exogenous nominal growth assumption substantially simpliﬁes the
analysis, allowing the paper to focus on ﬁrm level and sectoral incentives for responding to tax changes.16
The resulting extra money supply Mt in the economy is redistributed in a lump sum way





t = Tt is the total transfer to the consumers.
14 Changing this assumption of unexpected permanent tax shock to a model-consistent uncertainty of temporary tax shocks (with persistence parameter
0.95) had no numerically signiﬁcant effects on our asymmetry results at the month of tax change.
15 If the net prices Pn are taxed by τ VAT, then the gross price is P = (1+τ)Pn, so the tax revenue equals τPnC =
τ
1+τPC.
16 The constant nominal GDP growth assumption would be restrictive if we wanted to consider endogenous monetary policy responses to the tax shocks.
As this was not the case in Hungary, this assumption is acceptable.
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THE FIRMS
In what follows, we characterize the ﬁrms’ problem in sector s.17 As there are no sectoral interactions, the
ﬁrms’ problem does not depend on any aggregate endogenous variables and, as a result of the ﬁxed sectoral
expenditure shares, the growth of nominal expenditure (gPY) is going to be constant across sectors.
We introduce value added taxes (VAT) to the framework in a straightforward way: as we do not model
explicitly the production process, VAT in our framework is equivalent to a standard sales tax. We assume –
in line with the Hungarian legal rules – that ﬁrms set gross prices and they need to pay a ﬁxed menu cost in
case they decide to change these.
We distinguish two types of ﬁrms: there are N1 measure of ﬁrms with tax rate τ1 and N2 = N −N1 measure
of ﬁrms with tax rate τ2. By this, we are modeling the fact that ﬁrms producing competing goods might face
different VAT-rates and the tax changes inﬂuence only a subset of ﬁrms in each sector.
Each ﬁrm i is assumed to produce product i monopolistically, post gross prices Pt(i) and satisfy all demand
given this price. They face a small menu cost ˜ φt if they choose to change their prices; these are assumed
to be proportional to their revenues ensuring that the economy can not grow out of the price stickiness.
We also allow the menu cost to be smaller for in the months of tax shocks as an implicit way of modeling
multi-product ﬁrms with increasing returns to scale in their repricing technology. This is consistent with
lower average menu costs during periods with frequent price changes (like the tax change periods).












Pt(i)Yt(i)− ˜ wtLt(i). (9)
We assume that the ﬁrms use a constant returns to scale technology with only labor as a factor to produce
their differentiated good i and face idiosyncratic At(i) and sectoral technology shocks Zt. The production
functions of the ﬁrms are given by
Yt(i) = ZtAt(i)Lt(i). (10)
We assume that the sectoral technology shock Zt grows at a constant rate gZ. The difference between the
growth rate of nominal expenditure and sectoral technology will determine the trend inﬂation. By assuming
deterministic growth, we rule out inﬂation variability. The assumption makes the numerical algorithm
substantially easier and has no signiﬁcant effects on the results. 18
Idiosyncratic productivity shocks Ai are the now standard assumption of Golosov and Lucas (2007) to repro-
duce the observed large size of average price changes. The log of the idiosyncratic productivity is assumed to
follow an AR(1) process:
lnAt(i) = ρAlnAt−1(i)+￿t(i),
where the innovations are i.i.d. normally distributed random variables with mean zero and standard devia-
tion σA.
17 For notational convenience we suppress the reference to this.
18 Results with inﬂation variability using the Krusell-Smith (1998) algorithm are available from the authors upon request.
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Substituting the individual demand (equation (4)) and the labor demand (equation (11)) into the periodic
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˜ wt
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malized menu cost. Let ζ t = wt
Yt
Zt
be a sectoral cost factor. Substituting these variables into the normalized









￿−θζ tAt(i)−1 −φt, (13)
where the ﬁrm needs to pay φt only if it chooses to change its price.
The exogenous state variables of the normalized problem are given by (At(i),τ1
t,τ2
t,φt). The endogenous
state variables of the problem are given by (pt−1(i),πt,ζ t,Γt), where πt is the sectoral inﬂation rate and
Γt is the distribution of relative prices. To present the ﬁrms’ Bellman equation, we express the set of state
variables as (p−1(i),Ω(i)), where Ω(i) = (A(i),π,ζ ,τ1,τ2,φ,Γ).
Given these state variables the value of ﬁrm i is determined by the maximum it can get by changing (C) its
































where we used the fact that if the ﬁrm decides to keep its nominal price constant, its relative price p(i) is











The endogenous distribution of the relative prices Γ is, in general, a very complicated function of the last
period price distribution Γt−1, the current distribution of the sectoral idiosyncratic technology distribution
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THE EQUILIBRIUM
We consider a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium of the model. As there is no aggregate uncertainty
in the model, ﬁrms know the steady-state values of the aggregate endogenous state variables π,ζ ,Γ. The
equilibrium conditions are the following:
1. The representative consumer chooses Ct(i),Ls
t,Mt to maximize her utility function (1) given her bud-
get constraint (2), taking goods prices {Pt(i)}, the interest rates Rt and the sectoral wages {ws} as
given.
2. The ﬁrms are assumed to set prices Pt(i) to maximize their value function (14), (15), (16), given
the exogenous state variables (A,τ1,τ2,φ) and the values of the endogenous aggregate state variables
(πt,ζ t,Γt), and they also have correct beliefs about the random process of the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock A.
3. The central bank sets it,Mt to keep the nominal output growth gPY constant, and the ﬁscal transfers
are set in a way to imply balanced budget.
4. Market clearing in all goods markets Ct(i) = Yt(i).
5. Assets in zero net supply in nominal Arrow securities: Bt = 0.
6. Equilibrium in the sectoral labor markets implying sectoral wages ws
t equating sectoral labor demand
(11) and labor supply (6).
NUMERICAL SOLUTION
Under ﬂexible prices (zero menu costs) the model has a closed form solution. Inﬂation responds symmetri-
cally with a full pass-through to the changes in the VAT rates (please see the appendix for the derivation).
Under positive menu costs, the model has no closed form solution, so we use numerical methods to obtain
solutions for the equilibrium. The challenge of the framework is that the distribution of relative prices is a
statevariablewhichisaninﬁnitedimensionalobject. Tosolvethevalueandthepolicyfunctionsofindividual
ﬁrms, however, we only need to know about the development of two main moments of distribution: the
inﬂation rate (πt) and the sectoral cost factor (ζ t). To ﬁnd the equilibrium, the algorithms need to ﬁnd ﬁxed
points of these sequences such that the optimal response of the ﬁrms results in relative price distribution
development that is consistent with these sequences.
To ﬁnd these ﬁxed points, we use standard heterogeneous agent iterative algorithms. The experiment is to
ﬁnd the equilibrium response to unforeseen permanent tax changes. The algorithms ﬁrst obtain solutions for
theendogenousvariablesinthesteadystatesbeforeandafterthetaxchanges, thentheyobtainanequilibrium
transitional inﬂation path between these steady states (please see the appendix for details).
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4 The data
The data set we use contain store-level price quotes that are originally used to the monthly calculation of
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in Hungary. It spans from December 2001 to December 2006. In terms of
product categories, it contains price information on 550 different representative items; the total CPI-weight
of these items is 45.3% in 2006.19
The overall sample coverage by the sample and by some main CPI-categories is illustrated in Table 4. The
Statistical Ofﬁce categorizes products into 6 major sectors (processed and unprocessed food, clothes, durable
goods, energy, services and other goods). From these, the two largest sectors (processed food and services)
were the homogeneous sectors with products facing each VAT rates with substantial weight (the other goods
sector was not homogeneous). These sectors are used to calibrate the model and test its predictions.
Table 4
Coverage of the data set by some CPI-categories
CPI basket Sample
CPI category Weight Items Weight Items
Processed food 17.4% 139 16.1% 128
Services 25.1% 161 8.8% 78
TOTAL 100% 896 45.4% 550
The 550 representative items in the data set, that will form the units for our moments, can be regarded as
550 mini panels, containing time series of price quotes from different outlets. As an example, consider item
10001 “Bony pork rib with tenderloin”: the data set contains 7,922 observations from 162 different outlets,
i.e. 48.9 price quotes per outlet. For 96 of the 162 stores we have data for each month (T = 60). It is true for
most of the representative items in the data set that the list of observed outlets is typically unchanged. On
average, there are approximately 6,566 observations per representative item in the data set, which means that
the total number of observations exceeds 3.6 million (3,611,335).
Our analysis focuses on regular prices, rather than sales prices. The price collectors of the Central Statistical
Ofﬁce use a sales ﬂag to identify sales prices (i.e. prices that are temporarily low, and have a "sales" label), and
we use these ﬂags to ﬁlter out sales prices in the ﬁrst round. After this we also ﬁlter out any remaining price
changes that are (1) at least 10 %, (2) and are completely reversed within 2 months.
DATA MOMENTS
We calibrate model parameters by matching simulated “theoretical”model moments to their analogues in the
data. The moments are chosen such that they identify essential structural parameters of the model. We chose
some standard moments in non-tax-changing and tax-changing months:
• sectoral yearly inﬂation rate (π);
• frequency of price changes in non tax-changing months (INT);
• frequency of price changes in tax-changing months (IT);
19 We do not use the whole CPI-basket for several reasons. First, regulated prices are excluded. Moreover, in some cases (e.g. used cars, computers)
the Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce simply does not collect price data from different stores. We also exclude representative items for which the
maximum length of price spells were limited for some reason (seasonal data collection – like gloves, cherries etc – or data collection began late – LCD
TV-s, memory cards etc.). Finally, fuels, alcoholic beverages and tobacco were also dropped from the data set as frequent indirect tax changes make
it very difﬁcult to estimate the effect of VAT changes for these items. For more details on data collection and item exclusion, see Gabriel-Reiff (2010).
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• average absolute size of non-zero price changes in non tax-changing months (∆PNT).
Weusethesectoralmonthlyinﬂationratetocalibratethegrowthrateofaggregatetechnology(gZ). Theother
three moments identify the size of menu costs (φT,φNT) and the variance of the idiosyncratic technology
shocks (σA).
After the model parameters are calibrated, the model’s performance can be evaluated by observing how
close it gets to some non-matched moments, from which the most important one is the theoretical inﬂation
asymmetry. These non-matched moments are
• the inﬂation effect of a unit tax increase and decrease (γ+ and γ−), and their asymmetry.
• the average absolute size of non-zero price changes in tax-changing months (∆PT).
The moments are calculated as weighted averages of moments calculated for each representative items, as
we are interested in the behavior of an average “representative item”for the aggregate and each sectors. The
exact calculation of the data moments is described in the appendix, here we only show, as an example, how
the immediate inﬂation effects of VAT-changes are calculated. To be consistent with the model simulations,
















where the explanatory variables are month dummies, and other dummies corresponding to the three21
2004:01, 2006:01 and 2006:09 value-added tax changes. So the inﬂation effect of the 2006 January VAT-























with wj being the relative consumer expenditure weights of the items.




Matched moments Non-matched moments
Sector π INT IT ´PNT ´PT γ+ γ−
Aggregate 3.4% 12% 42.7% 11.6% 8.0% 1.11 0.41
Food 4.2% 13.5% 54.5% 9.9% 0.089 1.04 0.85
Services 8.3% 6.6% 28.6% 14.0% 0.090 1.15 0.33
The two sectors we focus on are quite different: the services sector faces higher inﬂation rate and higher price
rigidity (lower frequency of price changes) than the processed food sector.
20 The VAT-effects calculated by Gabriel and Reiff (2010) using panel estimations and the time-series method used here provided very similar results.
21 There was also a VAT change in January 2004, that was a 3% increase changing the tax rate to 15%. We ﬁlter out the effects of this shock, but do not
analyze it in the current paper.
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5 Results
We calibrate model parameters to hit some standard moments of the data, and our main interest is whether
the calibrated model is able to explain the (asymmetric) response of the inﬂation rate to the tax changes.
In this section, we present model calibrations ﬁrst with the standard non-sectoral homogenous menu cost
model, and then we introduce heterogeneous menu costs and sectoral calibrations in steps. The two major
sectors for which we do the calibrations are the processed food and the services sectors. These two sectors
are the largest in our sample – with 16.1% and 8.8% overall CPI-weights –, and both contain a mixture of
tax increase- and tax decrease-affected products. The services sector has higher trend inﬂation and stickier
prices, therefore our model predicts higher inﬂation asymmetry. We show that the sectoral calibration of the
multi-product version of our model is able to quantitatively reproduce the observed asymmetry.
PARAMETRIZATION
We ﬁx some parameters exogenously. We set β = 0.961/12 (implying 4% yearly real rate), and the mean
aggregate nominal growth rate to gPY = 0.0934·(1/12), which is the average monthly nominal consumption
growth in Hungary over the period 2002:01-2006:12. We set the value of θ (which determines the level of
competition within a sector) to 5, which is a usual number used in the industrial organization literature.22
Further, we set the persistence of the idiosyncratic technology shock ρA equal to 0.7, a value calibrated by
Klenow and Willis (2006). We found that the choice of ρA does not inﬂuence our results on asymmetry.
Finally, the inverse of the Frisch-elasticity (ψ) of the labor supply is set to zero, implying a perfectly elastic
labor supply.
The other four parameters of the model (gZ,φNT,φT,σA) are calibrated to match the data moments pre-
sented in the previous section. In particular, the sectoral technology growth gZ is calibrated to make the
simulated inﬂation rate equal to the mean sectoral inﬂation π, using the steady-state condition π = gPY −gZ.
The other three parameters do not have a clear one-to-one relationship with the targeted moments, but we
have a good idea of how they inﬂuence the moments we would like to hit. The menu cost parameters φNT
and φT decrease the frequency and increase the average absolute size of the price changes. The standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks σA increases both the frequency and the average absolute
size of price changes.
Tosumup, wehavefourcalibratedparameters(gZ,φNT,φT,σA)andweusethemtohitfourmajormoments
ofthedata(π,INT,IT,∆PNT). Inadditionwehaveunmatchedmoments, forwhichwehavenoindependent
model parameters: these are the inﬂation effects of a unit positive and negative tax shock (γ+ and γ−) and the
average absolute size of price changes in tax-changing months (∆PT). These unmatched moments are used
to evaluate the model’s performance.
CALIBRATION RESULTS
Table 6 contains the calibrated parameters for the different calibrations (for the aggregate sample: homoge-
neous and heterogeneous menu costs; for the sectoral samples: processed food and services). Table 7 presents
thevaluesofthemomentswhichweredirectlyusedforthecalibration(‘matchedmoments’)andtheresulting
values of the ‘unmatched’ moments including the asymmetry estimates.
22 There is no agreement about the value of θ in the menu cost literature, the values range from 3 (Midrigan, 2009) to 11 (Gertler-Leahy, 2008). The
choice of θ though inﬂuences our estimates of menu costs and the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks, but within this range it practically does
not inﬂuence our estimates on the estimated inﬂation asymmetry.
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labor supply.
The other four parameters of the model (gZ,φNT,φT,σA) are calibrated to match the data moments pre-
sented in the previous section. In particular, the sectoral technology growth gZ is calibrated to make the
simulated inﬂation rate equal to the mean sectoral inﬂation π, using the steady-state condition π = gPY −gZ.
The other three parameters do not have a clear one-to-one relationship with the targeted moments, but we
have a good idea of how they inﬂuence the moments we would like to hit. The menu cost parameters φNT
and φT decrease the frequency and increase the average absolute size of the price changes. The standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks σA increases both the frequency and the average absolute
size of price changes.
Tosumup, wehavefourcalibratedparameters(gZ,φNT,φT,σA)andweusethemtohitfourmajormoments
ofthedata(π,INT,IT,∆PNT). Inadditionwehaveunmatchedmoments, forwhichwehavenoindependent
model parameters: these are the inﬂation effects of a unit positive and negative tax shock (γ+ and γ−) and the
average absolute size of price changes in tax-changing months (∆PT). These unmatched moments are used
to evaluate the model’s performance.
CALIBRATION RESULTS
Table 6 contains the calibrated parameters for the different calibrations (for the aggregate sample: homoge-
neous and heterogeneous menu costs; for the sectoral samples: processed food and services). Table 7 presents
thevaluesofthemomentswhichweredirectlyusedforthecalibration(‘matchedmoments’)andtheresulting
values of the ‘unmatched’ moments including the asymmetry estimates.
22 There is no agreement about the value of θ in the menu cost literature, the values range from 3 (Midrigan, 2009) to 11 (Gertler-Leahy, 2008). The
choice of θ though inﬂuences our estimates of menu costs and the standard deviation of idiosyncratic shocks, but within this range it practically does
not inﬂuence our estimates on the estimated inﬂation asymmetry.
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Fixed parameters Hom. Het. Food Services
β Discount factor 0.961/12
θ Elasticity of substitution 5
ρA Persistence of idiosyncratic shocks 0.7
gPY Nominal growth 9.34%/12
ψ Inverse elasticity of labor supply 0
Non-sectoral Sectoral
Calibrated parameters Hom. Het. Food Services
gZ Sectoral technology growth 0.45% 0.45% 0.35% 0.08%
σA Std. dev. of idiosyncratic shocks 5.9% 5.9% 5.1% 6.4%
φNT Menu costs during ’normal’ times 3.2% 3.2% 2.2% 7.65%




Matched Moments Hom. Het. Food Services
Monthly Data 0.28% 0.28% 0.35% 0.69%
π inﬂation rate Estimate 0.27% 0.27% 0.35% 0.65%
Frequency during Data 12.0% 12.0% 13.5% 6.6%
INT ‘normal’ times Estimate 12.0% 12.0% 13.4% 6.6%
Frequency during Data 42.7% 42.7% 54.5% 28.6%
IT tax changes Estimate 16.4% 42.2% 54.5% 28.6%
Size during Data 11.6% 11.6% 9.9% 14.0%
∆PNT ‘normal’ times Estimate 11.6% 11.6% 10.0% 14.1%
Non-sectoral Sectoral
Unmatched Moments Hom. Het. Food Services
Inﬂation effect of Data 1.11 1.11 1.04 1.15
γ+
a unit tax increase Estimate 0.62 0.97 1.00 1.54
Inﬂation effect of Data 0.41 0.41 0.85 0.33
γ−
a unit tax decrease Estimate 0.61 0.93 0.87 0.25
Size during Data 8.0% 8.0% 8.9% 9.0%
∆PT tax changes Estimate 12.2% 9.0% 8.5% 11.0%
Standard model
The calibration results of the standard non-sectoral model with homogeneous menu costs are in the ﬁrst
columns of Tables 6 and 7. Results show that the model is able to hit the moments in ‘normal’ times with
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reasonable parameter values, but the model predicts essentially no asymmetry, and is unsuccessful in hitting
the frequency and the size of price changes at the months of the tax changes.
The parameter estimates are standard, similarly to previous menu cost models with idiosyncratic shocks, the
model needs volatile idiosyncratic shocks (σA = 5.9%) to be able to hit the large average absolute size and
frequency of the price changes. The menu cost is estimated to be 3.2% when paid, but note that it is only
paid in case of price change which – under no tax change – happens with 12% probability. It means that the
yearly menu cost proportional to the ﬁrms’ revenue is estimated to be 0.38%, which is within the range of
previous studies’ empirical estimates (Levy et al, 1997 estimates menu costs to be 0.70% of yearly revenues,
Klenow-Willis, 2006 estimates a yearly cost of 1.4%, while Nakamura-Steinsson, 2008a ﬁnds this measure to
be 0.2%).
The standard model, however, is unable to explain the inﬂation asymmetry observed in the data. While
the inﬂation effect of a unit VAT-increase and decrease are estimated to be 1.11 and 0.41 respectively, the
model only predicts 0.62 and 0.61. Furthermore, the frequency of price changes at the months of VAT-
changes (42.7%) is substantially underestimated (16.4%), and the average absolute size of price changes (8.0%)
is overestimated (12.2%).
Introducing heterogeneous menu costs
As a shortcut to assuming multiproduct ﬁrms with decreasing marginal menu costs as in Midrigan (2009), we
assume that the average menu costs are smaller at the months of the VAT-changes. This assumption allows us
to match the increased frequency of the price changes observed at the months of tax changes and get closer
to the observed decrease in their average absolute size.
The results of the heterogeneous menu cost estimation is shown in the second column of tables 6 and 7.
The results show that the best calibration is indeed one with lower menu costs during the VAT-shock: the
3.2% menu cost during normal times is estimated to drop approximately to its third: 1.15%. With this
calibration, the model is still able to hit the moments during ‘normal’ times, and it is also able to reproduce
the higher frequency and the lower size of the price change at the month of the tax changes (though it
slightly overestimates the average absolute size in tax-changing month). The results also show, however, that
though the model predicts somewhat higher asymmetry (0.97 and 0.93 positive and negative inﬂation effects,
respectively) than in the homogeneous menu cost case, it still signiﬁcantly underestimates the asymmetry
observed in the data.
Sectoral calibrations
In this subsection we calibrate the model to sectoral moments, and show that this way we are able to repro-
duce the asymmetry observed in the data.
As column 3-4 of Tables 6 and 7 show, sectoral estimations are successful in hitting the major moments. The
major difference between the two sectors is that the services sector faces both higher monthly trend inﬂation
(0.69% compared to 0.35%) and higher estimated menu costs (7.65% compared to 2.2%23) than the processed
food sector. These differences can fully explain both the substantially lower fraction of price changing ﬁrms
in the services sector (6.6% compared to 13.5%) and the substantially higher average absolute size of price
changes in the services sector (14.0% compared to 9.9%) than in the processed food sector. The calibrated
idiosyncratic technology processes are somewhat different: the standard deviation of the process is estimated
to be relatively high (6.4%) in the services sector, while in the processed food sector this standard deviation
is lower (5.1%).
The menu costs at the month of the VAT-shocks φT are calibrated to reduce around third of its normal value
φNT: it is estimated to reduce to 0.56% (from 2.2%) for the processed food sector and to 3.2% (from 7.65%)
23 Implying reasonable expected menu costs, 0.50% and 0.30% of revenues.
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for the services sector. The average size the month of tax changes is somewhat underestimated in case of the
processed food sector and overestimated in case of the services sector.
The sectoral calibrations, in line with the stylized facts, predict much lower asymmetry in the processed food
sector than in the services sector. The model is also successful in quantitatively predicting the asymmetric
inﬂation effects of the tax changes. In the processed food sector the inﬂation effects of unit tax increases are
estimated to be 1.04 and 0.85 respectively, which are hit quite well by the model with similar numbers of 1.00
and 0.87. In the services sector, the coefﬁcients of the unit tax changes are 1.15 and 0.33, respectively, and the
same moments in the calibrated model are 1.54 and 0.25.
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6 Discussion
The fact that the standard non-sectoral model seriously underestimated the observed asymmetry, while the
sectoral estimates were able to get quantitatively close to the sectoral asymmetries suggests an aggregation
bias of the aggregate calibration. We argue that this is a joint result of a strong theoretical interaction effect
of inﬂation and price stickiness on the asymmetry and an empirical correlation between higher inﬂation and
price stickiness in the sectoral level. Figure 5 presents the smoothed24 asymmetry (as the difference between
the unit effects of tax increase and decrease over their average) predicted by the model for different values
of trend inﬂation and menu costs. It shows the asymmetry for three different levels of increasing returns
to scale in the ﬁrms’ repricing technology modeled as the proportion between the menu costs in the non-
tax changing (φNT) and the tax changing months (φT). The ﬂattest plane is the results with non-increasing
returns to scale (φNT = φT). Note, that the asymmetry is increasing in the cross-effect of inﬂation and menu
costs, though the effect is quantitatively small. The asymmetry is increasing more with cross effects if the
returns to scale is higher: φT = 0.5φNT, and φT = 0.33φNT respectively, and the relationship is relatively
stable for the returns to scale values we ﬁnd in the calibration exercise.
Itisthecross-effectofinﬂationandmenucoststhatexplainsmostofthevariationintheobservedasymmetry.





= f (π,φ) ≈ δ0 +δ1πφ, (20)
where u stands for the asymmetry, we ﬁnd for the baseline case with φNT/φT = 0.33 that the estimate of
the cross term is positive, large (ˆ δ1 = 0.32) and highly signiﬁcant (with a standard error of 0.012), and the
equation explains 94% of the variance in the simulated asymmetry. The results are almost identical for the
φNT/φT = 0.5 case, but substantially smaller with the case with homogeneous menu costs: the cross effect
is still highly signiﬁcant, but its value is lower (δ1 = 0.078) with standard error of 0.004 and R2 = 0.81. This
simulation, thus, provides numerical evidence on the ampliﬁcation effect of lowering the menu cost at the
month of the tax change and, thereby, increasing the frequency of price change in line with the evidence
observed in the data. Unless sectoral inﬂation rates and the menu costs are uncorrelated, this strong cross-
effect implies a potentially substantial bias in an aggregate model with average inﬂation rate and menu costs.
Assuming a relationship with cross term as in equation 20 and sectoral heterogeneity of inﬂation π and menu
costs φ, the expected aggregate asymmetry is given by:







where the second equation comes from the deﬁnition of the sectoral covariance of inﬂation and menu costs.
The ﬁrst sum on the right hand side is the simulated asymmetry from the aggregate calibration using the
average inﬂation and average price stickiness. The second product is the sectoral aggregation bias. The bias
is higher the higher the parameter of the cross-term is, and the higher the covariance is between sectoral
inﬂation rate and price stickiness.
The positive relationship between the inﬂation rate and the price stickiness is the result of the relative im-
portance of sectors with both high inﬂation and high price stickiness. Services give a major part of the story:
they have 34.2% weight in the Hungarian consumption basket. The frequency of services price changes is
only 6.6% that is much lower than the average of 12% of our sample between 2002 and 2006. The services
trend-inﬂation during the same period, on the other hand, is very high: it is 8.3% that is much higher that
the average inﬂation rate of 3.4%.
24 We used a ﬂexible Chebyshev projection methods to obtain an estimate of the function disregarding simulation errors.
25 With the simulation errors
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for the services sector. The average size the month of tax changes is somewhat underestimated in case of the
processed food sector and overestimated in case of the services sector.
The sectoral calibrations, in line with the stylized facts, predict much lower asymmetry in the processed food
sector than in the services sector. The model is also successful in quantitatively predicting the asymmetric
inﬂation effects of the tax changes. In the processed food sector the inﬂation effects of unit tax increases are
estimated to be 1.04 and 0.85 respectively, which are hit quite well by the model with similar numbers of 1.00
and 0.87. In the services sector, the coefﬁcients of the unit tax changes are 1.15 and 0.33, respectively, and the
same moments in the calibrated model are 1.54 and 0.25.
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Figure 5
























Looking at a more disaggregated level, Figure 11 plots a histogram of the distribution of 123 sectors over their
trend inﬂation between 2002 and 2006 and their average frequency of price change during ‘normal’ times,
each sector weighted by their relative consumption expenditure. Considering the frequency of price change
as a proxy for price stickiness, we see that the distribution is not symmetric: there are more mass at the
high inﬂation-low frequency quadrant. As frequency is increasing with the inﬂation rate, the ﬁgure actually
underestimates the asymmetry of the inﬂation-menu cost distribution.
Figure 6
Weighted histogram of sectoral trend-inﬂation and frequency
In the Appendix, we show by looking at US data that these relationships in the data are not particular to
Hungary. Services, in the US, also have stickier than average prices and higher than average inﬂation rates.
Furthermore, sectoral frequencies and inﬂations on a sample similar to ours show a positive relationship
suggesting a stronger positive relationships between inﬂation and the (unobserved) menu costs that directly
inﬂuences the aggregation bias.




A standard monetary shock in the model is a one-time permanent change in the nominal GDP (PY), or,
equivalently, a one time shock to the growth rate of nominal GDP (gPY). A demand shock like this has
similar asymmetriceffects on theinﬂation rate thanthe supply-side VAT shock. Figure 7 shows thesimulated
inﬂation asymmetry to a symmetric large (5%) positive and negative monetary shocks.26
Figure 7

























The strong inﬂuence of the inﬂation-menu cost cross effect on the inﬂation asymmetry is very similar to the
VAT-shockofasimilarsize. Theregressionequation20inthiscasehasacross-effectcoefﬁcientofδ1 = 0.226,
that is somewhat lower than in the VAT case, but still high and highly signiﬁcant.
ASYMMETRIC SELECTION
A major factor driving the effects of inﬂation and menu costs on the simulated inﬂation asymmetry is the
asymmetry in the endogenous selection of ﬁrms that change their prices. It is instructive to divide the price
change distribution f (x) to two parts: the distribution of desired price changes g(x) and the adjustment
hazard of the ﬁrms h(x), where x is the desired price change of a ﬁrm. The price change distribution comes
from the multiplication of these two functions: f (x) = g(x)h(x). Figure 8 show these functions for tax
increases and tax decreases for the aggregate calibration (with moderate inﬂation rate and menu costs) and
for the services sector calibration (with higher inﬂation rate and menu costs). Let’s ﬁrst look at the left panel
with the aggregate calibration. The hump shaped functions show the desired price change distribution, that
have, intuitively, higher median values for the tax increases than for the tax decreases. The tubby shaped
functions show the adjustment hazards of the ﬁrms, and these are very close to each other. The solid areas
show the distribution of price changing ﬁrms: it shows that - intuitively - the proportion of price increasing
ﬁrmsarehigherforthetaxincreaseandlowerforthetaxdecrease. Thesymmetryofthedistribution, i.e. that
the position and distribution of price increases for the tax-increase are similar to the position and distribution
of the price decreases for the tax-decrease (and similarly for the price decreases for the tax increase and price
increases for the tax decrease) is the reason we observed no signiﬁcant simulated inﬂation asymmetry for the
aggregate case.
26 The size of the monetary shocks are of similar size as the VAT shocks, because that is when we can expect similar frequency responses that are
resulted by the lower menu costs at the months of the shock.
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Figure 8
Desired price change distributions and adjustment hazards for tax increases and decreases for calibrations with
different menu costs and inﬂation rates






















The right panel shows the same functions for the services sector calibration with higher trend inﬂation
and menu costs. The signiﬁcant asymmetry we found is the result of the asymmetric distribution of price
increases and decreases for the tax increase and tax decrease we can see on the ﬁgure. There are two important
effects causing this. First, the higher inﬂation and menu costs pushes the distribution of desired price changes
to the right for both the tax increase and the tax decrease case. The reason of this is fairly straightforward:
ﬁrms are going to set their optimal nominal price above their static optimum, because in this way they can
keep their relative price the closest to its optimum for the duration of their price spell. Higher menu costs
increases the expected duration of a price spell, while higher inﬂation increases the pace of depreciation of
the ﬁrm’s relative price. Figure 9 shows the development of the median of the desired price change as a
function of inﬂation and menu costs for a steady state distribution: the strong interaction term we saw for
the simulated inﬂation asymmetry is very apparent here. The second effect is that higher menu costs and,
to a lesser extent, higher inﬂation also increases the width of the inaction regions of the ﬁrms, but has no
numerically signiﬁcant effect on the central position of them.
Figure 9









































The asymmetry of the inﬂation effect comes from the interaction of the desired price distribution and the ad-
justment hazard: a desired price change distribution with higher median changes both the relative frequency
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of price increases and decreases and their average size. The asymmetry can be decomposed into frequency

















dτ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
sizeeffect
, (22)
where, as before, I is the frequency, ∆P is the average size of price changes. The + and − superscripts refer
to the positive and negative shock, respectively. Figure 10 shows the percentage proportion of the frequency
effects for inﬂation and menu cost values with signiﬁcant asymmetry (0 menu cost and 0 inﬂation cases are
dropped). It shows that for most values of the parameter space the frequency effect explains over 90% of
the asymmetry. It is lower in areas where, because of low menu costs and high inﬂation, the steady state
frequency of price changes are already high and the asymmetry relatively low.
Figure 10








































For our parametrization, positive trend-inﬂation is a necessary condition of signiﬁcant inﬂation asymmetry.
In a similar framework as ours, Devereux and Siu (2007) provided a different argument for asymmetry by
showing that individual ﬁrms’ strategic incentives are asymmetric: while prices are strategic complements
in case of positive aggregate shocks to the (nominal) marginal cost, they are strategic substitutes in case
of negative shocks. The Devereux and Siu (2007) channel would imply asymmetry even without positive
trend-inﬂation. However, our simulations with 0 trend-inﬂation rate show no signiﬁcant asymmetry for our
parametrization.
Devereux and Siu (2007) found that this strategic asymmetry is larger with more intense competition (higher
elasticity of substitution parameter θ). But our negative asymmetry results were true even if we increased the
level of competition substantially (θ = 11), implying that the 5%-points tax changes were not large enough
in our model to make the strategic asymmetry numerically signiﬁcant.
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7 Conclusion
The Hungarian experiment showed that asymmetric response to (large) symmetric aggregate shocks can be
an empirically relevant issue. It provides a policy relevant macroeconomic reason supporting state dependent
pricing models, that - contrary to standard ﬂexible price and time-dependent pricing models - can explain the
aggregate asymmetry. The paper found that the standard quantitative menu cost models similar to Golosov
and Lucas (2007), however, seriously underestimate the observed asymmetry. It showed that introducing
multi-productﬁrmsandcalibratingthemodelonasectorallevel, the(sectoral)trendinﬂationcansuccessfully
account for the observed sectoral asymmetry.
The reason of the aggregation bias is the strong inﬂuence of the sectoral inﬂation-price stickiness cross-effect
on the asymmetry in the model and the positive correlation between inﬂation and price stickiness in the
data. The paper argues that real effects of even large negative monetary shocks can be substantial even in the
standard Golosov and Lucas (2007) framework suggesting more serious real costs of disinﬂations relative to
real gains of inﬂationary surprises. As long as these effects are present in other countries - which seems to be
the case in the US - asymmetric aggregate response to symmetric shocks should be a serious consideration,
and should be taken into account for optimal policy design.
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the case in the US - asymmetric aggregate response to symmetric shocks should be a serious consideration,
and should be taken into account for optimal policy design.
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Appendix
CALCULATION OF THE FLEXIBLE PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
When describing our numerical solution technique, we noted that we start the iterative procedures from the
fully ﬂexible steady-states. In this subsection we show the analytical solution of the model under perfectly
ﬂexible prices.27 We show how we can derive the inﬂation pass-through of tax shocks in this case.








with ζ t = wt
Ct
Zt
, and wt =
￿ wt
PtCt
being the normalized nominal wage.
















































where the summation is a CES-aggregate of individual "effective" tax rates
1+τi(t)
Ai(t) , denoted as an average tax
rate 1+τ(t).


























which says that the optimal relative prices and relative outputs are determined by the relative effective tax
rates (i.e. the ratio of the individual effective tax rates
1+τt(i)
At(i) and the average tax rate 1+τt).
The wage rate will be determined on the labor market by making labor demand and supply equal. Labor














27 Sectoral subscripts s are suppressed for notational convenience.
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where the last term is a weighted average of 1
1+τt(i)-s (the weights sum to 1 by the deﬁnition of 1 + τt in
equation (25)), and can therefore be written as another average of individual tax rates: 1
1+￿ τt
. Therefore the













a function of deep parameters and individual tax rates.
With this equilibrium wage we can derive the level of individual outputs and prices. Rearranging the aggre-
gation equation (25), we can write w(t)
Ct
Zt
= ζ t =
(θ−1)
θ[1+τt]

















(where we used the approximation 1+τt ≈ 1+￿ τt).
























































Finally, from the price level equation (33), inﬂation is the difference between the nominal GDP-growth (gPY,





























When calculating the steady-state, we solve for the aggregate cost factor ζ and distribution of relative prices
Γ simultaneously with the following iterative procedure:
1. We assume that the steady-state value of ζ is equal to a speciﬁc value ζ 0. (In the start of the iterative
process we set ζ 0 to be equal with the ﬂexible-price value of ζ .)
2. Given this ζ 0, and τ1,τ2,φ,π, we solve for the value function of the ﬁrms with value function itera-
tion. We do this over a discrete two-dimensional grid in (p−1,A).28
3. With the resulting policy functions, we simulate an artiﬁcial data set. The initial relative price distri-
bution is the one under ﬂexible prices, and we do the simulation for subsequent time periods until we
reach the steady-state relative price distribution Γ.
4. Finally we calculate the resulting aggregate cost factor ζ 1, and if this is different from the initially
assumed value of ζ 0, we start over this procedure (with ζ 0 = ζ 1) until convergence in ζ .
We solve for steady-state under the initial tax regime and also under the resulting tax regime after the tax
change.
Transition between steady-states
Our main focus is to study the inﬂation path between the steady-states corresponding to different tax regimes
(before and after the tax change). We do this by iterating in the resulting inﬂation path until we ﬁnd a ﬁxed
point in the path. The iteration entails the following steps:
1. We assume that the new steady-state will be achieved T periods after the tax change. Our notational
convention is that the tax change occurs at t = 1, and the new steady state will be reached at t = T +1
2. We guess the transitional inﬂation path π1,π2,...,πT. Our initial guess is the inﬂation path under fully
ﬂexible prices.
3. Given the assumed inﬂation path and the constantly growing nominal GDP and aggregate technology
Z, we obtain the resulting path of the real GDP and aggregate cost factor ζ = w Y
Z .
4. We calculate the series of value and policy functions with backward induction: we know that at time
t = T +1 the value function of the ﬁrms (VT+1) is the value function under the after tax-change steady-
state. Given πT,ζ T and VT+1, we can use equations (14), (15), (16) to solve for the value function VT.
Then given VT and πT−1,ζ T−1, we can use the same equations to obtain VT−1, etc. With this method
we can calculate the series of value and policy functions for the time periods t = 1,...,T.
5. We use the resulting series of value and policy functions to simulate an artiﬁcial data set about the tran-
sition period between the steady-states. From this artiﬁcial data set we calculate the resulting inﬂation
path.
6. Iftheresultinginﬂationpathisdifferentfromtheoneweassumedinitially, westartoverthisprocedure
until convergence in the inﬂation path.
28 We have 100 equidistant grids in the log relative price and 13 equidistant grids in the log idiosyncratic productivity shocks. We veriﬁed that the grid is
ﬁne enough: increasing the number of grids in either dimensions does not change the results.
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CALCULATING DATA MOMENTS
To describe the calculation of the mean sectoral monthly inﬂation rate, let us introduce some notation. We
index time by t, representative items by s, and stores by i. Then the mean sectoral (i.e. representative







where Ni is the number of stores observed both at time t and time t −1 in sector (representative item) s.







and ﬁnally the mean monthly inﬂation rate for the whole economy (or broader CPI-categories) is obtained





where ws areCPI-weights(weusetheCPI-weightsin2006). Notethatseasonalvariationinmonthlyinﬂation
rates does not affect our estimates as we are using price changes between January 2002 - December 2006 to
calculate mean representative item-level inﬂation rates.
The second and third moment that we use for matching is the frequency of price changes (both in non tax-
changing and tax-changing months). These are again calculated at the representative item-level, and then
















is a dummy for price changes, and Ns is the total number of observations for represen-





Again, seasonal variation in frequencies does not bias our frequency estimates as we use price change data
between January 2002 - December 2006 for the frequency calculations.





















The calculation of the inﬂation effect of tax changes is described in Section 3 of the paper.
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APPENDIX
SECTORAL INFLATION AND FREQUENCY IN THE US
An essential reason of the aggregation bias the paper identiﬁed is the positive sectoral correlation between
inﬂationandpricestickiness(menucosts). Asubstantialreasonofthiscorrelationcomesfromtheprominent
role of the services sector with both higher inﬂation and price stickiness. This is also true in the US (with
services over 30% weight in the US consumption basket), though not as prominently as in the emerging
country Hungary. To obtain a measure of price stickiness, we use sectoral frequencies of price changes
reportedbyNakamuraandSteinsson(2008b)for1804-digitEntryLevelItems(ELI)ofUSCPI.Theweighted
average of these frequencies for the services sector is 13.6% that is substantially lower than the 21.1% average
price changing frequency. The trend inﬂation is 2.7% in the services sector between 1998-2005 while the
average was 2.25% during this period.
The main text has also shown that in a weighted histogram of Hungarian sectors the frequency of price
changes is indeed tend to be lower (meaning higher price stickiness) in sectors with high inﬂation rate. As
inﬂation itself causes higher frequency, this observed relationship implies that the (weighted) correlation
between inﬂation and the unobserved menu costs is indeed positive. Here we show a similar ﬁgure for the
US to show that this relationship can be expected to be present in other countries as well.
Weusethefrequenciesof180ELIsectorsreportedbyNakamuraandSteinsson(2008b). TheBureauofLabor
Statisticspublishthesectoralinﬂationratesforonly111ofthesesectors. Weusethe2-digitELIinﬂationrates
for the remaining sectors - where available - to obtain the sample of 170 sectors. For valid comparison to our
sample, we also dropped 10 additional sectors of tobacco, new and used cars and gasoline and energy items
from the sample, as these were also missing from the Hungarian sample.
Figure 11
Weighted histogram of sectoral trend-inﬂation and frequency in the US
The weighted histogram for the US data shows a somewhat smaller but still signiﬁcant negative relationship
between sectoral inﬂation and the frequency of price changes than the Hungarian data. It implies a stronger
positive relationship between sectoral inﬂation rates and menu costs suggesting that the aggregation bias can
be expected to be present in the US as well.
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